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I. Introduction 
The Mexican tequila crisis of 1994 has posed a puzzle for the traditional 
explanations of financial crises based on macroeconomic imbalances. In 1994, 
Mexico’s GDP growth was 4.4%, while the traditional fiscal deficit and the current 
account deficit accounted for 0.1% and 7% of GDP, respectively. Nevertheless, 
the crisis of 1994-95 involved a peso devaluation of 44% in nominal terms and an 
increase in nominal interest rates  from 16% in the last quarter of 1994 to 49% in 
the first quarter of 1995. This led to a substantial decline of 6.2% in GDP in 1995 
and 16.4% fall in capital investment. Credit to the private sector as a percentage 
of GDP fell from over 45% of GDP in the last quarter of 1994 to less than 41% in 
the last quarter of 1995 and further to roughly 20% by 2000. 
 
Four years later, oil international prices dropped sharply and as an exporter of oil, 
the Mexican economy suffered a negative shock. Interest rates increased again 
and the exchange rate jumped from 8 to 9 pesos per dollar. Although the 
consequences of the devaluation were milder than those observed in 1994 and 
1995, economic activity slowed down significantly and GDP growth rate dropped 
again from 6.8 in 1997 to 5.0 in 1998. 
 
A new view has emerged in the literature, which emphasizes currency 
mismatches of assets and liabilities by agents within the economy as the engine 
for the propagation of financial crisis. According to this view, when a devaluation 
occurs in the presence of foreign currency debt, it leads to a dramatic drop in 
investment. This is what Krugman (1999) has labeled the “Bernanke-Gertler 
effect”, referring to the amplification of negative shocks due to the combination of 
capital market imperfections and weak balance sheets (Bernanke and Gertler 
(1989)). In this context, Krugman acknowledges that it is true that a devaluation 
improves the financial situation of exporting firms –the competitiveness effect–, 
but he also argues that this effect is offset by the mismatch between foreign-
currency liabilities and assets denominated in local currency, increasing 
  2indebtedness of firms with dollar denominated debt –net-worth effect–. In 
contrast, empirical results obtained by Bleakley and Cowan (2002) for a panel of 
Latin American countries–henceforth B&C–suggest that the competitiveness 
effect dominates the net-worth effect. 
 
Assessing which effect dominates, however, is ultimately an empirical question, 
and it may vary across time and countries. While the evidence is abundant for 
some Asian and Latin American countries, not much has been done for the most 
recent Mexican crisis. Aguiar (2002), for example, looks at the immediate effect 
of the crisis on investment and currency composition of debt in 1995. He finds 
that the immediate effect of the devaluation was to reduce investment for firms, 
and that investment was negatively related to net worth. He also finds that 
exporting and large firms borrowed mostly in foreign currency. However, the time 
period on which this study focuses is limited to the 1994-95 and is not able to 
exploit any of the panel characteristics of the data. The author is unable to 
account for firm heterogeneity and longer-term effects of the devaluation. 
Furthermore, it is not clear what determines the net worth of firms. While it is true 
that firms with larger foreign debt have a lower net worth, the effect is not 
statistically significant. It is not clear, therefore, whether the net worth of firms 
declined due to the effects of devaluation on their debt or because of factors 
related to their fundamentals. 
 
Another paper that implicitly explores the 1994-95 peso crisis is B&C. Based on a 
database for over 500 non-financial firms in 5 Latin American countries –
including Mexico– they estimate at the firm level, the effect of holding foreign-
currency-denominated debt on investment during an exchange rate realignment. 
According to their results, the effect of a devaluation on investment is 
“consistently” positive. 
 
Forbes (2002) also addresses the Mexican experience, although for a different 
period. Using a sample of over 13,500 firms from 42 countries –including 
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2000. Results suggest that in the year after depreciations, firms have significantly 
higher growth in market capitalization (when measured in local currency or US 
dollars), but significantly lower growth in net income (when measured in local 
currency). Firms with greater foreign sales exposure have significantly better 
performance. Firms with higher debt ratios tend to have lower net income growth 
after devaluations, but there is no robust relationship between debt levels and 
other performance variables. Finally, the author claims that there is no consistent 
relationship between a firm’s profitability or capital/asset ratio and the impact of 
devaluations on firm performance.
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In this context, the first objective of this paper is to contribute to this debate 
studying specifically the Mexican experience during the 1994-95 peso crisis and 
onwards. Using firm-level data we examine the role of a currency mismatch in 
exacerbating the negative effects of the 1994 and 1998 devaluations in the 
corporate sector. The main differences between this exercise and existing 
studies are the following. First and most important, our data set is a panel just for 
Mexican firms, that allows to study the evolution of firms over time and control for 
firm heterogeneity, as opposed to just country effects as in B&C. Secondly, we 
do have data on net sales in foreign currency, so we can actually control for the 
positive effects of devaluations and estimate the direct effect of dollar debt on 
firms´ performance.  
 
In order to better comprehend the overall effects of a devaluation at the firm level 
it is important to understand in the first place why domestic firms borrow in 
foreign currency. Despite its prominent role in the aftermath of macroeconomic 
crises, it seems that little is known about the precise determinants and 
consequences of the currency composition of debt, particularly at the 
microeconomic level. Economic theory suggests that this can be explained 
through hedging exchange rate risk. However, as we shall see later, one puzzle 
                                                 
1 See Nucci and Pozzolo (2001) for a review of the Italian experience. 
  4in the Mexican data is why firms were so imperfectly hedged before the 1994 
crisis.  Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) set up a model where the general 
equilibrium effects of liquidity constraints drive a wedge between the marginal 
product of capital and interest rates, and induce firms to borrow 
disproportionately in foreign currency.  
 
Aguiar (2002) claims that he found “only weak evidence” to support the standard 
hedging model in Mexican firms, and that it is not necessarily true that firms 
allocate cash flow to states with relatively profitable investment opportunities. 
Nonetheless, his results show that exporting and large firms borrow 
disproportionately in foreign currency. Alternatively, Martínez and Werner (2002) 
suggest that the decision of borrowing in pesos or dollars highly depends on the 
exchange rate regime, due the implicit guarantees given by the government 
under a fixed exchange regime. 
 
Along these lines, the second objective of this paper is to investigate what drives 
Mexican firms to borrow in foreign currency. Taking advantage of our data set, 
we seek to answer what determined the currency composition and term structure 
of debt in Mexican firms during the 1989-2000 period. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data 
used in the empirical analysis. Section 3 presents the equations to be estimated, 
the empirical methods utilized and the obtained results. Finally, section 4 





The data used in this study comes from the Mexican stock market (Bolsa 
Mexicana de Valores or BMV). The data is on yearly basis from 1989 to 2000. 
While the sample is restricted to mostly publicly traded firms and some non-
  5traded ones, this does not represent a serious limitation for the study. First, this is 
the only data set of its kind available in Mexico and provides detailed information 
on the maturity structure of debt as well as its currency composition. Second, 
while small firms, which are not listed on the stock market, could probably be 
exporters, they are not likely to have access to international capital markets. Our 
sample, therefore, contains the firms where it is most likely to observe currency 
mismatches. 
 
Each firm in the sample has an identifier, which allows us to link it across time. 
The panel is not balanced and we do observe entry and exit. Exit can take place 
if a firm is de-listed from the stock exchange, or if it merges with another one. In 
either case, the BMV removes the firm from the panel. However, we retain firms, 
which are de-listed in the panel for the entire period for which data is available. 
For mergers or other ownership changes, we follow B&C and aggregate data for 




Although our full sample includes 378 firms, only 202 firms were considered in 
the empirical analysis. This follows from the following adjustments. First, we 
removed firms with less than 4 years of data. Second, we did not include firms, 
which have zero capital for one or more years. Third, we eliminated firms where 
the investment-to-capital ratio is beyond the mean +/- 3 standard deviations for 
that year, for one of more years. For the GMM estimations we further had to 
reduce our sample to 196 firms who had data for at least four consecutive years. 
Investment for each firm was calculated subtracting gross capital at time t+1 from 
gross capital at time t. 
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2 We have experimented with other exercises, such as keeping the two merged entities as 
separate through the period with almost no change in results.  
3 Due to data limitations, i.e. many missing observations on investment expenditures, we could 
not build up a series of capital stock using the perpetual inventory method.  
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Table 1 defines all variables, and Tables 2 to 6 present some features of the 
adjusted sample. All data is in real terms, deflated by the annual average 
producer price index (base year=1994).  
 
Table 2 (Figure 1) shows the investment-to-capital ratio for the whole sample. As 
can be noticed, this ratio increased moderately from 1989 to 1993, rose sharply 
in 1992-93 –perhaps due to the positive expectations following the 
announcement of NAFTA– and fell dramatically before the crisis, from about 25% 
to zero in 1994. This fall in investment might be explained by the change in 
expectations due to the Chiapas uprisings at the beginning of 1994 and the 
assassinations of several political actors throughout the year. The crisis at the 
end of 1994 exacerbated this fall, and investment was only able to recover to its 
pre 1994 levels by 1997. The devaluation of 1998 also shows up in a significant 
fall in investment ratios.  
 
Tables 3, 4 and 5 present, respectively, the summary statistics of the proportion 
that short-term foreign debt represents of total short-term debt for all firms, firms 
with non-zero foreign debt and only exporting firms. As can be observed (Figure 
2) the ratio in all three cases increased gradually in the years leading up to the 
  8crisis, increased sharply in 1994 and declined after both the 1994-95 and 1998 
peso devaluations. As expected, under the fixed exchange regime firms tend to 
borrow heavily in dollars as opposed to pesos, but they switched back to pesos 
after the hit of the devaluation and the adoption of the flexible exchange rate. 
Interestingly, this pattern is more pronounced in exporting firms, perhaps 
because these businesses are the ones with broader access to credit in 
international markets.  
 
Table 6 (Figure 3) shows the evolution of the ratio of short-term foreign debt to 
exports and indicates the degree of hedging undertaken by firms. While in the 
early 1990s the median of this ratio oscillated around 1.5, it reached a peak of 
2.3 in 1994.
4 Apparently, given the favorable expectations following NAFTA, 
exporters gained a lot of trust from creditors and borrowed heavily in dollar-
denominated liabilities. This left them very vulnerable to exchange rate 
devaluations. After the devaluation of 1994-95 and again in 1998, the dollar debt 
to exports ratio fell significantly. 
 
Finally Table 7 shows the difference in second moments of some ratios between 
exporters and non exporters. A weighted average of the variance across time of 
these ratios is constructed, with weights proportional to the average of the ratio 
for the firm through this period. This exercise shows that the investment of 
exporters fluctuated more than that of non exporters in this period.  They also 
faced at least three times higher volatility in their earnings. This suggests that 
exporters operated in a far more risky environment than non exporters.  
 
3. Methodology and empirical results 
 
a) Devaluation and investment  
In this section, we explore the effect of foreign currency liabilities on firm level 
investment in periods of exchange rate volatility. As mentioned above, a 
                                                 
4 The dramatic increase in the mean can be accounted for by one firm.  
  9consequence of the currency mismatch might lead to a deterioration of firm net 
worth (due to inflated domestic-currency values of debt). This weakening of 
corporate balance sheets could attenuate or even reverse the usual 
expansionary effects of the devaluation. 
 
In order to examine the effect of foreign currency liabilities on firm level 
investment, we started estimating equation (14) in B&C by OLS as they did. The 




t i t t t i it D e e D I ε ϕ α γ + + ∆ + ∆ × = − − 1 ,
*
1 , ) (  
 
where Iit stands for investment,   is dollar debt, 
*
it D t e ∆  represents the variation in 
the real exchange rate (nominal exchange rate divided by CPI) expressed in 
logarithms,   is total debt and 
T
it D t i, ε  is the error term. As in their paper, we also 
add additional firm –and macroeconomic– control variables to the basic equation 
and normalized all variables by total assets. All data is expressed in 1994 dollars, 
again following their methodology.  
 
Regression results are presented in Table 8. The first two columns of Table 8 
shows that the variable   has a significant negative sign that contrasts with 
the significant positive sign found by B&C. In columns 3 through 6 some 
additional specifications are reported, and as can be noticed, the variable 
 is no longer significant. These results indicate that the positive effect of 
dollar denominated debt found by B&C is not as robust as the claim, at least for 
Mexico. 
e Dit ∆ ×
*
e Dit ∆ ×
*
 
Table 9 reports the results of B&C regressions estimated by fixed-effects instead 
of OLS. Two main conclusions can be drawn. First, the fact that the results in 
both tables are quite different implies that firm heterogeneity is important in the 
dataset and it should be taken into consideration in the rest of the estimation. 
  10Second, the variable   still has a negative sign and is significant for the 
most basic specifications, although not for all of them. This confirms the previous 
findings and allows us to claim that definitely the positive sign found by B&C is 
not robust. In other words, the evidence for a competitiveness effect seems 
weak. 
e Dit ∆ ×
*
 
Next, we expand the B&C regressions to include exports and other measures of 
firm performance as explanatory variables. The dependent variable is the ratio of 
investment over capital and as explanatory variables we initially include just the 
firm variables foreign debt, EBITDA, exports and sales. Notice that all these 
variables have been deflated by the assets of the firms. In addition to these 
variables we have included the previous variables interacting with year dummies 
for 1994, 1995 and 1998 in order to capture the different environment that firms 
experienced during the 1994-95 and 1998 crises.  
 

















 is the ratio of investment to capital for firm i at time t,  refers to firm 






β  is a firm specific effect and  it ε is the error term. Within the firm specific 
independent variables, we also include total sales and exports, total debt and 
foreign currency debt. 
 
Regression results are presented in Table 10. The main conclusions are the 
following. Using specification (2) as the benchmark we can see that six variables 
turned out to be significant: the ratio of EBITDA to assets, the ratio of exports to 
assets, the ratio of sales to assets, and the interaction of two of these variables 
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expected whereas the sign of exports is negative and the sign of foreign debt in 
1994 and 1998 is negative. The negative sign of exports might just reflect that 
exporting firms need to invest less since they are typically less capital intensive 
than importing firms, but it may also reflect the higher volatility of earnings 
referred to in Table 7. The negative signs associated to foreign debt in 1994 and 
1998 reflect the big impact that crises had for the firms with high levels of foreign 
denominated debt. Table 10 shows that foreign debt is negative although not 
significant. This sign contrasts again with the positive sign adduced by B&C. We 
added a macroeconomic variable, the ratio of bank credit over GDP, to the model 
considered above. Notice that this variable is positive and significant, but, as 
expected, it becomes negative when interacts with the 1994 dummy.  
 
Finally specification (5) includes a full set of year dummies interacted with dollar 
debt and with exports. The first thing to notice is that these interactions vary 
significantly across years. Hence in 1993, firms with large amounts of dollar debt 
invested heavily. However, this was reversed in 1994. These firms could only 
recover their investment by 1997. In 1998, dollar debt again affected investment 
adversely. As far as exporters were concerned, although exports appeared with a 
negative sign in the equation, interactions of exports with yearly dummies tell a 
different story. In the years up to 1994, exporters invested more than non 
exporters. This trend was reversed in 1995. In 1997 again, exports enter the 
investment equation with a positive and significant sign.  There is no evidence 
that  firms anticipated the devaluations and adjusted their behavior prior to the 
events. If anything, their actions left them more vulnerable to the devaluation. 
 
In Table 11 we experiment with some interactions with real exchange rates rather 
than yearly dummies. We find that  all interactions with dollar debt enter 
negatively in the investment equation. There is therefore little evidence to 
suggest that the competitive effect of a devaluation outweighs the balance sheet 
effect.  
  12Since there could be a concern that some independent variables included in the 
equation, especially dollar debt are simultaneously determined with investment, 
we also perform some GMM estimations using lagged values of these variables 
as instruments. Estimations are performed in first differences to eliminate fixed 
effects. The results of one step estimations with robust standard errors are 
shown in Table 12. As can be noticed, foreign debt is negative and significant in 
two out of three specifications. It also enters negatively in all the interaction 
terms. The effect of earnings and sales are consistently positive and significant, 
as we would expect. Exports still enter with a negative and sometimes significant 
sign in non interacted as well as in interacted terms.  
 
Results of some other specifications with a full set of year dummies are 
presented in Table 13.
5 Once again, the effect of foreign debt is negative but not 
significant, since the yearly dummies capture the devaluation effects in 1994 and 
1998. EBITDA and sales are positive related to investment and exports  are 
consistently negative and significant.  
 
b) Debt composition 
According to economic theory, firms borrow in different currencies to hedge 
against risk. Two questions then are: (i) why do firms in only some specific 
countries tend to follow this pattern, and (ii) why do only some firms have access 
to international markets. Regarding the first question, some scholars claim that 
emerging markets have a natural tendency for liability dollarization (see 
Eichengreen and Hausmann (2000), and Calvo and Reinhart (2000)). Other 
people –like Mishkin (1996)– tend to believe that the exchange rate regime 
explains for the most part why firms borrow in foreign currency. According to this 
theory, firms borrow more heavily in dollars under a fixed exchange regime, given 
the implicit guarantee provided by the government.  
 
                                                 
5 Notice that we cannot interact variables with year dummies as in the fixed effect specification 
because using lagged values of interactions as instruments is not valid.  
  13A recent paper by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) argues that firms that are 
liquidity constrained are likely to borrow heavily in dollars since in general 
equilibrium these constraints drive interest rates below the marginal product of 
capital. Hence excessive dollar debt, i.e. inadequate hedging, arises as a 
somewhat paradoxical result of a lack of collateral.  
 
In this section of the paper we explore the determinants of Mexican firms’ 


















 is the share of dollar denominated debt to total debt, Z
f refers to firm 
specific variables,  i δ  are dummies to identify firms across time and  stands for 
the error term. The firm specific variables are exports, total assets and the rate of 
growth of sales.  Since the dependent variable cannot be negative and lies 
between zero and 1, we use a log transformation. Since some firms have zero 
debt abroad, the equation is also estimated with a Tobit and with a censored 
Tobit. Results are presented in Tables 14 and 15. 
it u
 
As can be observed, both the ratio of exports to debt and firm size –proxied by 
total assets– are consistently positive and significant across different 
specifications. The same is true when only lagged variables are considered. 
These results are consistent with previous evidence
6 and confirm the hypothesis 
that big firms and/or exporters, i.e. firms with collateral, are more likely to borrow 
in foreign currency. When we look at lagged variables, the ratio of dollar debt to 
total debt also turned out to be positive and significant. Once again, the ratio of 
exports to total debt and total assets are positive and significant, and the same is 
true when only lagged variables are considered. 
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6 See for example Martínez and Werner (2002) and Aguiar (2002).  
In order to control for possible endogeneity the equation was also estimated in 
first differences with GMM and lagged instrumental variables. Tables 16 and 17 
show the results. In contrast to the previous results we find that exports are 
negatively correlated with foreign debt. As before, the positive sign of sales 
growth and assets is robust across specifications. 
 
 
4. Conclusions and extensions 
In the context of a highly globalized world with almost no barriers in international 
financial markets it is not surprising to observe countries borrowing in different 
currencies to hedge against risk. What it is interesting is that this process is no 
longer exclusive to governments and today is also common among private firms. 
 
Recent economic literature has addressed the topic of multiple currency 
borrowing from various perspectives. At the microeconomic level, scholars have 
concentrated their attention in explaining two questions: i) why firms tend to 
borrow in currencies other than the domestic, and ii) what is the impact of a 
devaluation on private investment in the presence of foreign currency 
denominated debt. This paper provides some empirical evidence for the Mexican 
experience in the last decade. 
 
The main findings are as follows. Large firms and export-oriented firms tend to 
borrow more heavily in foreign currency. The presence of foreign currency debt 
poses a significant risk to balance sheets at the time of devaluation. Our findings 
suggest that in Mexico the balance sheet effects of a devaluation far outweigh 
the competitiveness effects. In standard investment equations, we find that 
foreign debt and exports are negatively correlated with investment while 
earnings, assets and sales are not. There is some evidence that the investment 
and earnings of exporters are far more volatile than those of non exporters which 
may  be the reason behind this negative sign. Another interesting result is that 
  15apparently  in the years leading to the crises, firms positioned themselves in a 
way which rendered them particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of a 
devaluation. Firms with high amounts of dollar denominated liabilities and exports 
invested substantially before the crisis. These were also the firms most affected 
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  16Appendix A. Definition of variables  
 
 
Table 1. Variable description 
  
D Total  debt 
D*  Total dollar debt 
Assts Total  assets 
X Total  exports 
EBITDA  Earnings before accrued interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization 
Sales  Total sales (domestic and exports) 
Bank Credit  Credit to private sector provided by banks 
E  Real exchange rate 
e ∆   Variation of real exchange rate expressed in logs 
Sales growth  Annual variation of total sales 
log y  Natural logarithm of y 
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Appendix B. Summary statistics 
 
Table 2. Investment/Capital 
Year  No of Firms Mean  Median 
Std 
Deviation 
1989 60  0.0428  0.0064  0.1425 
1990 127  0.0668  0.0361  0.1699 
1991 150  0.0665  0.0344  0.1683 
1992 162  0.0894  0.0410  0.1695 
1993 167  0.2632  0.2306  0.2735 
1994 147  0.0098  0.0060  0.1484 
1995 137  -0.0392  -0.0599  0.1259 
1996 134  0.0343  0.0242  0.1671 
1997 128  0.0806  0.0550  0.1362 
1998 113  -0.0167  -0.0090  0.1531 
1999 94  0.0120  0.0036  0.0966 
2000 n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 








Firms  Mean Median 
Std 
Deviation 
1989 60  0.2475  0.2143  0.2316 
1990 127  0.2873  0.2208  0.2655 
1991 150  0.3184  0.2807  0.2881 
1992 164  0.3053  0.2451  0.2821 
1993 175  0.3183  0.3017  0.2621 
1994 169  0.3886  0.3930  0.2947 
1995 158  0.4220  0.4268  0.3001 
1996 152  0.3583  0.3466  0.2828 
1997 137  0.3548  0.3524  0.2781 
1998 127  0.3711  0.3839  0.2858 
1999 113  0.3251  0.3146  0.2639 
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Table 4. Short Term Foreign Debt/Short Term Debt 
Firms with non-zero foreign debt 
Year  No of Firms Mean  Median 
Std 
Deviation 
1989  46 0.3228 0.3061 0.2132 
1990  103 0.3543 0.3692 0.2513 
1991  122 0.3915 0.3487 0.2708 
1992  132 0.3793 0.3419 0.2659 
1993  149 0.3739 0.3497 0.2447 
1994  147 0.4468 0.4583 0.2716 
1995  143 0.4683 0.4718 0.2763 
1996  136 0.4005 0.3999 0.2691 
1997  122 0.3984 0.3838 0.2634 
1998  115 0.4098 0.4255 0.2725 
1999  103 0.3567 0.3424 0.2552 




Table 5. Short Term Foreign Debt/Short Term Debt 
Exporting firms 
Year  No of Firms  Mean  Median 
Std 
Deviation 
1989  45 0.2907 0.2774 0.2188 
1990  80 0.3908 0.4054 0.2417 
1991  94 0.4254 0.4263 0.2576 
1992  103 0.4116 0.4174 0.2621 
1993  107 0.4106 0.4026 0.2384 
1994  105 0.5139 0.5569 0.2579 
1995  109 0.5071 0.5580 0.2741 
1996  108 0.4319 0.4304 0.2681 
1997  92 0.4691 0.5274 0.2516 
1998  86 0.4764 0.5338 0.2543 
1999  82 0.3840 0.3660 0.2562 











  19Table 6. Short Term Foreign Debt/Exports 
Year  No of Firms Mean  Median  Std Deviation 
1989 45  1.6093  0.6473  3.9902 
1990 80  3.3812  1.2727  7.1595 
1991 94  5.8081  1.6193  18.1250 
1992 104  5.8649  1.7026  12.6269 
1993 107  5.9134  1.8778  11.7592 
1994 105  50.9801  2.3347  366.5397 
1995 109  13.8450  1.2637  67.5086 
1996 108  4.8988  0.8511  16.4119 
1997 92  7.6851  0.8093  32.1631 
1998 86  6.9136  0.8750  18.2148 
1999 85  11.0444  0.7279  50.2445 
2000 77  18.2304  0.7747  132.2806 
 
Table 7. Variance Analysis 
 I/K  EBITDA/Assts D*/Assts  Sales/Assts
Exporters (98 firms) 
1        
Max 0.232  0.074  0.296  0.205 
Min 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Median 0.020  0.003  0.002  0.014 
Average 0.031  0.006  0.009  0.027 
Weighted average*  0.071  0.022  0.113  0.074 
        
Non Exporters (98 firms)        
Max 0.203  0.028  0.093  0.932 
Min 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Median 0.024  0.002  0.000  0.019 
Average 0.035  0.004  0.004  0.056 
Weighted average*  0.065  0.007  0.029  0.310 
        
Exporters (69 firms) 
2        
Max 0.232  0.074  0.296  0.181 
Min 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Median 0.022  0.003  0.002  0.012 
Average 0.032  0.006  0.102  0.023 
Weighted average*  0.080  0.022  0.134  0.000 
        
Non Exporters (127 firms)        
Max 0.203  0.051  0.093  0.932 
Min 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Median 0.024  0.003  0.001  0.019 
Average 0.035  0.005  0.004  0.053 
Weighted average*  0.074  0.016  0.037  0.330 
        
 
1
 At least one year with Exports/Sales greater than or equal to 0.10. 
 
2
 At least one year with Exports/Sales greater than or equal to 0.20. 
* Weights are equal to the proportion that the average of each ratio represents of the total. 
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Table 8. Bleakley and Cowan (OLS) (Dependent Variable Iit) 
    (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
         
D* x    e ∆ -0.544**  -0.549** 0.075 0.104 0.075 0.057 
  (0.094) (0.095) (0.157) (0.153) (0.154) (0.154) 
D  -0.058** -0.061** -0.088** -0.051** -0.059** -0.045** 
  (0.015)  (0.0162) (0.017) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) 
D* -0.039  -0.037  -0.0021  -0.0031  0.0031  -0.033 
  (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027)  (0.0267) 
e ∆     0.055 0.054 0.052 0.036 0.033 
    (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
D x    e ∆     -0.426** -0.393** -0.379** -0.355** 
      (0.088) (0.088) (0.089) (0.087) 
EBITDA       0.184** 0.168** 0.148** 
       (0.062) (0.066) (0.065) 
L log Assts          0.000  0.008** 
         (0.000)  (0.0017) 
L log Asstsx    e ∆        -0.008** 
                  (0.001) 
R-squared  0.083 0.085 0.094 0.102 0.106 0.117 
Note: All variables are normalized by total assets. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses.  
* Significant at 90 percent level. 
** Significant at 95 percent level. 
 
Table 9. Fixed-effects (Dependent Variable Iit) 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
          
D* x   e ∆ -0.558**  -0.555**  -0.105 -0.087 -0.114 -0.119 
  (0.085) (0.084)  (0.164) (0.165) (0.166) (0.164) 
D -0.030  -0.027  -0.055**  -0.046**  -0.051**  -0.043* 
  (0.023) (0.021)  (0.022) (0.022) (0.026) (0.025) 
D*  -0.200** -0.203**  -0.160** -0.156** -0.164** -0.162** 
  (0.049) (0.047)  (0.049) (0.049) (0.056) (0.056) 
e ∆      -0.442  -0.429  -0.434  0.002  0.028** 
    (0.732)  (0.701) (0.691) (0.105) (0.095) 
D x    e ∆     -0.310** -0.303** -0.297** -0.290** 
      (0.092) (0.090) (0.090) (0.089) 
EBITDA       0.065  0.036  0.058 
        (0.067) (0.071) (0.070) 
L log Assts          0.000  0.009** 
         (0.000)  (0.002) 
L log Assts x ∆    e           -0.010** 
                  (0.002) 
R-squared  0.230 0.231  0.235 0.236 0.239 0.248 
Note: All variables are normalized by total assets. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses (clustered 
on year).  
* Significant at 90 percent level. 
** Significant at 95 percent level. 
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Table 10. Fixed-effects (Dependent Variable Iit/Kit) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
D*/Assts -0.053  -0.072  -0.002 -0.051 
 (0.069)  (0.067)  (0.067) (0.070) 
EBITDA/Assts 0.332**  0.245**  0.240** 0.275** 
 (0.085)  (0.090)  (0.086) (0.086) 
Exports/Assts -0.439**  -0.465**  -0.316** -0.383** 
 (0.071)  (0.071)  (0.061) (0.063) 
(D*Assts) x 1994  -0.262**  -0.110  -0.064  
 (0.089)  (0.097)  (0.108)  
(Exports/Assts) x 1994  0.106  0.134  0.163  
 (0.179)  (0.162)  (0.159)  
(D*/Assts) x 1998  -0.286*  -0.239*  -0.332** -0.244** 
 (0.149)  (0.132)  (0.150) (0.135) 
(Exports/Assts) x 1998  -0.079  -0.024  -0.141 -0.062 
 (0.104)  (0.112)  (0.101) (0.107) 
Sales/Assts   0.071**  0.034 0.064** 
   (0.034)  (0.032) (0.033) 
(Sales/Assts) x 1994    -0.055**    
   (0.019) 
(Sales/Assts) x 1998    -0.036*   -0.040** 
   (0.019)   (0.019) 
(D*/Assts) x 1995       -0.053** 
      (0.095) 
(Exports/Assts) x 1995       -0.070 
      (0.083) 
(Sales/Assts) x 1995       -0.074** 
      (0.022) 
D Log (Bank Credit/GDP)      0.154**  
     (0.020)  
(D Log (Bank Credit/GDP)) x 1994      -0.414**  
     (0.113)  
    
R-squared 0.326  0.335  0.361  
  
  
Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses (clustered on year). 
* Significant at 90 percent level. 
** Significant at 95 percent level. 
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  23Table 11. Fixed effects (Dependent Variable Iit/Kit) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)     
        
D*/Assts  0.744**  -3.250**  -0.129**   
  (0.298)  (1.064)  (0.066)   
EBITDA/Assts  0.320**  0.322**  0.257**   
  (0.086)  (0.086)  (0.086)   
Exports/Assts  -0.187  -1.440**  -4.480**   
  (0.197)  (0.696)  (0.055   
Sales/Assts  0.072**  0.073**  0.068**   
  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.031)   
(D*/Assts) x e  -22.701**       
  (7.757)       
(Exports/Assts) x e  -7.107       
  (5.126)       
(D*/Assts) x log e    -0.955**     
    (0.322)     
(Exports/Assts) x log e    -0.299     
    (0.210)     
(D*/Assts) x    e ∆     -0.531**   
      (0.213)   
(Exports/Assts) x ∆   e     -0.357**   
      (0.174)   
         
R-squared  0.333  0.334  0.329   
N = 1419           
Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses (clustered on year). 
* Significant at 90 percent level. 
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Table 12. GMM First differences (Dependent Variable Iit/Kit) 
One step estimates with Robust Standard Errors 
   (1)  (2)  (3)     
        
D*/Assts  0.351  -2.818**  -0.343   
  (0.450)  (1.368)  (0.242)   
EBITDA/Assts  0.385**  0.390**  0.266**   
  (0.151)  (0.152)  (0.138)   
Exports/Assts  -0.359  -2.673**  -0.996**   
  (0.373)  (1.513)  (0.186)   
Sales/Assts  0.122*  0.123**  0.122*   
  (0.074)  (0.075)  (0.073)   
(D*/Assts) x e  -17.150*       
  (10.025)       
(Exports/Assts) x e  -14.089*       
  (8.716)       
(D*/Assts) x log e    -0.770*     
    (0.407)     
(Exports/Assts) x log e    -0.543     
    (0.345)     
(D*/Assts) x    e ∆     -0.225   
      (0.299)   
(Exports/Assts) x ∆   e     -0.523**   
      (0.279)   
N = 1188           
* Significant at 90 percent level. 
** Significant at 95 percent level. 
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Table 13. GMM First Differences (Dependent Variable Iit/Kit) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
Constant  0.014 0.013 0.014 0.018 0.134 
  (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019)  (0.18) 
L I/K  0.036  0.064       
  (0.042)  (0.045)    
D*/Assts  -0.120  -0.85** -0.128 -0.128 -0.077 
  (0.095) (0.104) (0.104) (0.119) (0.108) 
EBITDA/Assts  0.057   0.127   
  (0.116)   (0.126)   
Exports/Assts  -0.338** -0.314** -0.269** -0.252** -0.418** 
  (0.128) (0.128) (0.135) (0.136) (0.154) 
Sales/Assts 0.093    0.068    0.075 
  (0.068)   (0.072)   (0.070) 
D92  0.013 0.007 0.013 0.002 0.012 
  (0.030) (0.032) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) 
D93  0.154** 0.142** 0.154** 0.136** 0.152** 
  (0.030) (0.031)  (-0.030) (0.030) (0.029) 
D94  -0.285** -0.300** -0.281** -0.296** -0.283** 
  (0.031) (0.033) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) 
D95  -0.044** -0.050** -0.053** -0.073** -0.059** 
  (0.026) (0.027) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) 
D96  0.072** 0.084** 0.064** 0.069** 0.075** 
  (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) 
D97  0.019 0.024 0.018 0.019 0.027 
  (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
D98  -0.110** -0.108** -0.108** -0.109** -0.103** 
  (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) 
D99  0.014 0.016 0.012 0.005 0.008 
   (0.023)   (0.024)   (0.022)   (0.022)   (0.022) 
         
N=992 (196 firms; 1991-1999)           
* Significant at 90 percent level. 
** Significant at 95 percent level. 
Note: Instruments are all possible lagged values of independent variables.  
 
 
  26Appendix D. Regression results for the debt composition equation 
 
Table 14. Determinants of debt composition 
Dependent variable: log ((D*/D)/(1-D*/D))             
   OLS     Fixed Effects 
   (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 
               
X/D  0.726**        -0.219     
  (0.153)        (0.165)     
Sales growth  -0.197        -0.145     
  (0.125)        (0.076)     
log Assts  0.414**        1.129**     
  (0.027)        (0.183)     
L Dependent 
Variable        0.765**           0.320** 
         (0.029)           (0.042) 
L X/D    0.842**  0.220**       -0.101  -0.054 
     (0.163)  (0.077)       (0.138)  (0.092) 
L Sales growth      0.101         0.035 
       (0.092)         (0.082) 
L log Assts    0.411**  0.083**       0.859**  0.396** 
     (0.028)  (0.021)       (0.148)  (0.126) 
R-squared  0.215  0.207  0.655     0.731  0.734  0.775 
N  1236   1209  1209     1236  1209  1209 
* Significant at 90 percent level. 
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Table 15. Determinants of debt composition 







on D*/D<1   
X/D  0.163**     0.321**   
   (0.020)     (0.040)   
Sales growth  -0.037*     -0.050*   
   (0.023)     (0.031)   
log Assts  0.093**     0.028**   
   (0.005)     (0.001)   
Sigma  0.300**     0.375**   
   (0.006)     (0.012)   
Log Lik  -443.992     -461.855   
N=1418         
         
L D*/D  0.883**     0.972**   
   (0.017)     (0.012)   
L X/D  0.037**     0.043**   
   (0.012)     (0.014)   
L Sales growth  0.007     0.01   
   (0.014)     (0.016)   
L log Assts  0.003**     0.002**   
   (0.001)     (0.001)   
Sigma  0.173**     0.186** 
   (0.004)     (0.004)   
Log Lik  -290.140     -357.628   
N=1418            
 
* Significant at 90 percent level. 
** Significant at 95 percent level. 
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Table 16. Determinants of debt composition 
Dependent variable: log ((D*/D)/(1-D*/D)) 
   GMM 
   (1)  (2)   
       
L log ((D*/D)/(1-D*/D))  0.238**     
  (0.052)     
L X/D  -0.535**  -0.458**   
  (0.144)  (0.171)   
Sales growth    0.289   
    (0.245)   
L Sales growth  -0.049     
   (0.124)     
L log Assts  0.569**  1.763**   
   (0.210)  (0.327)   
R-squared       
N  781  982   
* Significant at 90 percent level. 
** Significant at 95 percent level. 
Note: Instruments are all possible lagged values of independent variables. 
 
 
Table 17. Determinants of debt composition 
Dependent variable: D*/D 
   GMM 
   (1)  (2)   
       
L D*/D  0.284     
  (0.067)**     
X/D    -0.088**   
    (0.029)   
L X/D  -0.100**     
  (0.031)     
Sales growth    0.037   
    (0.033)   
L Sales growth  -0.053*     
   (0.038)     
L log Assts  0.082**  0.301**   
   (0.037)  (0.058)   
R-squared       
N  991  991   
* Significant at 90 percent level. 
** Significant at 95 percent level. 
Note: Instruments are all lagged values of independent variables. 
 
 
  29